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Summary
Drawing on arguments seeking a grounded development of the concept of social justice,
this article investigates the potential bearing of the concept on South African geographical
research. It is argued that it is philosophically desirable to conduct empirical research fo-
cused on the interpretations which agents give to the concept of social justice. It is then
suggested that a re-thinking of the debates on normative social justice in the light of ar-
guments for contextual interpretations of this concept provide a framework for a discourse
of social justice within South African geographical studies. In particular, three avenues of
enquiry are suggested. First, that South African geographers aim at uncovering what the
concept of social justice represents with reference to multiple variables and institutions
within various spatio-temporal settings. Secondly, that these empirical descriptions of so-
cial justice can be compared with various debates on social justice currently found in the
social sciences. Finally, that geographical theorisation of the concept of social justice be
developed with reference to empirical illustrations of the meaning of the concept.
Maatskaplike geregtigheid en geografie: na ’n Suid-
Afrikaanse geografiese navorsingsagenda
Die artikel ondersoek die relevansie van argumente wat die ontwikkeling van die maatskap-
like geregtigheidskonsep empiries wil begrond vir geografiese navorsing in Suid-Afrika. Daar
word geredeneer dat dit uit ’n filosofiese hoek wenslik is om empiriese navorsing te fokus op
agente se interpretasies van die maatskaplike geregtigheidskonsep. Daarna word aangedui dat
argumente ten gunste van kontekstuele interpretasies van die onderhawige konsep ’n
raamwerk bied waarbinne die diskoers hieroor deur Suid-Afrikaanse geograwe gevoer kan
word. Veral drie moontlik relevante navorsingsrigtings word op grond hiervan aangestip.
Eerstens, dat gestreef word om bloot te lê wat die opvattings oor maatskaplike geregtigheid
is met betrekking tot ’n verskeidenheid veranderlikes en instellings en binne verskillende tyd-
ruimtelike kontekste. Tweedens, dat sodanige empiriese beskrywings van maatskaplike gereg-
tigheidsopvattings vergelyk word met verskeie huidige debatte rondom hierdie aange-
leentheid in die sosiale wetenskappe. Laastens, dat teoretisering van die konsep binne geogra-
fiese geledere geskied aan die hand van empiriese illustrasies van betekenistoekenning daaraan.
Dr G E Visser, Dept of Geography, University of the Free State, P O Box 339,
Bloemfontein 9300; E-mail: visserge@sci.uovs.ac.za
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Social justice refers to the distribution of society’s benefits andburdens and how this comes about. The concept is traditionallythe concern of moral and political philosophy, although various
disciplines have contributed to its development and application. Re-
cent debates, however, suggest that spatial investigation should be
associated with normative social justice theory (Harvey 1996; Smith
1994). The re-visitation of normative understandings of social justice
and its role as a framework for geographical investigation can be ex-
plained on the basis of two sets of considerations. First, there appears
to be a shift in the understanding of morality associated with the re-
cent post-structuralist rejection of ethical dogmatism and universal-
ism as a basis for explaining how moral codes are generated (Young
1990a). Secondly, structuralists suggest that there is a need for uni-
versal, egalitarian frameworks to guide geographical research and
practice, enabling the improvement of the human condition for all
(Harvey 1996; Smith 2000).
A paradoxical consequence has been that geographical debates on
social justice increasingly express a particularist, post-structuralist
need for emancipation and the inclusion of the poor, the marginalised
and the oppressed (Young 1990a, 1990b), as well as incorporating
universalist concerns insisting that institutions of governance propa-
gate material equality in the process (Pratt 1993, Smith 2000).
Whereas these debates, particularly as seen in the work of Smith
(1994a, 2000) and Harvey (1992, 1996, 2000), aim to develop nor-
mative frameworks to bridge the “discontinuities” divide between
universalist and particularist social justice theorisation, questions
centring on what may be learnt from contextual constructions of so-
cial justice are largely absent from geographical investigation (Visser
2000a). Unlike the participants involved in the international geogra-
phical discourse of social justice, South African geographers have not
directly engaged with this concept. This is not to say that moral con-
cerns do not underpin or reveal themselves implicitly in South Afri-
can geographical research, but rather that investigations focused on
the concept of social justice have not been forthcoming. Neverthe-
less, the limited body of research focused on the intersection between
the meaning of the concept of social justice and geographical change
in South Africa echoes the duality in theoretical positioning seen at
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the international level. The work of Smith (1994a; 1995; 2000), ta-
king a liberal-egalitarian stance on morality, is the most important
in terms of social justice investigation in the South African context,
while Visser (2000a; 2000b; 2001), suggesting a classic liberal alter-
native, has also recently engaged this field of study.
This article presents an argument for an empirically driven inves-
tigation of social justice within the South African context. A key
suggestion is that in exploring such possibilities geographers may be
able to demonstrate and ultimately theorise the role of spatiality as
underlying the distributive ideals of specific geographical settings. It
is suggested that what “real people” actually interpret social justice
to be is framed by, and contributes to, the interpretation of spatial re-
lations. These interpretations can change moral perspectives, as those
involved constantly (re)negotiate the meaning(s) of distributional is-
sues, with findings which may form the foundation for moral philo-
sophical reflection. The aim of this article is not, however, to demon-
strate the superiority of one theoretical understanding of social jus-
tice over another, but rather to present a set of arguments that creates
a space in which South African geographers can contribute towards
the mapping of changing views on social justice. These arguments
are, in the nature of philosophical debate, not complete, but ongoing.
The investigation of the relationship between interpretations of so-
cial justice as revealed in empirical reality and those that are theore-
tically defensible as superior therefore remains unresolved.
In order to investigate these concerns, the first part of the article
focuses on the types of arguments that geographers may put forward
in the pursuit of uncovering the impact of geography on the meaning
accorded by differentially located agents to the concept of social jus-
tice. Thereafter, the discussion aims to demonstrate that there is —
relative to work completed elsewhere in the social sciences — cause
for considering such an argument. Finally, consideration is given to
what this may mean in terms of a South African geographical enga-
gement with social justice.
1. The case for an empirically grounded theorisation
of social justice
Recent studies in political science and sociology suggest that social
justice theorisation can, and in fact should be influenced and rework-
ed by a consideration of the ways in which decision-makers and com-
munities interpret social justice (Marshall et al 1997; Miller 1992;
Swift et al 1995). Such studies, which have not yet researched geo-
graphical or urban planning theorisation of social justice, suggest
that within various empirical settings interpretations of the concept
are vastly more diverse and widely located in geographical and histo-
rical contexts than current debates suggest. The apparent reluctance
of geographical studies to engage with empirical understandings of
social justice has, however, to be read against broader disciplinary pa-
radigm shifts.
Speculations as to what constitutes a just society have been the
stuff of political philosophers from ancient Greece onwards. How-
ever, since the 1960s social justice has increasingly become a key ele-
ment in political and moral philosophy. It is also within this context
that John Rawls’s A theory of justice (1971) emerged, causing an ex-
plosion of liberal political theory. David Harvey’s Social justice and the
city (1973), drawing on aspects of this general debate, was another
text which transformed the field of geography. While aspects of this
work dealt with social justice, its main engagement was the funda-
mental social and economic processes that structure space in Western
society — in other words, capitalism. Consequently, since the early
1970s geographical discourse has focused on the nature of capitalism
and its spatial consequences, a topic which proved more challenging
than that of social justice itself. As Smith (1992: 128) noted, “Anglo-
American geography appeared to have considered the unjust out-
comes of the prevailing capitalist system too obvious to require refi-
ned analysis”. The “cultural turn” of the social sciences in the late
1980s led to a new paradigm in which the meta-theoretical and uni-
versalist principles of historical materialism and structuralism were
increasingly rejected. The emergence of a post-modern geography
and post-structuralist social theory led to the development of a more
particularist interpretation of the moral realm. In this context de-
bates concerning social justice have also been re-examined (Harvey
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1996). Although a productive field of research has developed from
this normative turn, the main focus has been on the causality of “the
cultural” in shaping spatiality. Whereas spatiality represents geogra-
phy’s key intellectual construct, geographical social justice research
has not asserted the explicit causal power of interpreted space in sha-
ping understandings of social justice. One reason for this reluctance
has been the inability to present an argument for the place of empi-
rical research in the development of social justice theorisation (Visser
2000a).
Superficially, however, it can be argued that there is little reason
for social justice theorists to pay attention to the findings of social
scientists generally or geographers in particular. Basically, the justi-
fications of moral principles given by Rawls (1971), Nozick (1974)
and Hayek (1976), for example, occupy different logical spaces from
the descriptions and explanations of the moral principles to which
people in the “real world” actually subscribe. It could be suggested
that empirical research is unlikely to contribute to political-theore-
tical debates, mainly because the philosophical task of justification
remains largely immune from whatever one might discover about the
beliefs current in any particular society concerning justice. This view
can, however, be countered by Miller’s (1992) arguments suggesting
that empirical beliefs can be regarded as “data” against which theo-
ries of justice may be “tested”. Supporting Miller’s view, Elster
(1992) argues that such theories need “empirical foundations” and
that these may be provided by studies of the manner in which insti-
tutions allocate the scarce resources at their disposal. In this regard,
productive engagements have proceeded from the collaborative work
of Swift et al (1995). These authors suggest a number of arguments
to justify the “empirical” study of social justice as a “foundation”
upon which normative theory may develop.
First, perhaps uncontroversially, they suggest that knowing that
others think differently gives the philosopher a sense of humility and
fallibility, and an awareness of the need for caution. Nevertheless, the
philosopher may still end up rejecting popular opinion. Thus, des-
criptive and explanatory empirical research may be useful to the nor-
mative project, but remains external to the theorisation of the con-
cept of social justice. In this case, however, there is still no serious
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suggestion that what other people think, or why they think it, can
do more than give the philosopher a reason to reconsider his/her own
arguments (Swift et al 1995).
Swift et al’s (1995: 19) second consideration is that interpretations
of justice that do not correspond to ordinary thinking are doomed to
failure, no matter how sound or robust they may be in philosophical
terms. Quoting Dunn, they observe that “if historical agents are to
be provided with reasons for acting, they must be furnished with rea-
sons which are reasons for them” (Swift et al 1995: 19; my italics). In
addition to the need to ensure an argument that can actually moti-
vate those to whom it is addressed, there is, however, another point.
Compromise for the sake of achieving, on balance, better outcomes
than would be achieved by insisting on pure truth may be justified.
The boundaries of political possibility are to a large extent set by po-
pular opinion, so that judging what can be done politically requires
knowledge of that opinion. Swift et al (1995: 19) add to the claim
that it makes little sense to advocate something “impossible” to
achieve. Thus the responsible theorist should concern him/herself
with the sets of feasible outcomes given the status quo, and has a
variety of moral arguments for taking lay beliefs into account when
constructing normative theory. Nevertheless, one does not need to
regard those beliefs as making any difference to the truth about
justice, for the conclusion may well be simply that justice is
unattainable and will be so while popular opinion remains as it is.
Swift et al’s (1995: 19) third argument is much stronger. The idea
is that the right answer in politics, in this case the distributive prin-
ciples that are justified for a society in question, may be internally re-
lated to lay beliefs. Whereas the second argument regarded those be-
liefs merely as constraints upon the feasibility of achieving a just so-
ciety and the justification of principles of justice as occurring quite
independently of popular beliefs, the third argument claims that at
least part of the answer to the question of how goods should be dis-
tributed is to be found by considering the way in which people think
they ought to be distributed. One may develop the position that
there are good moral reasons why one should respect the opinions and
judgements of fellow citizens. In terms of this view, however, it is not
so much that there is no other manner by which to arrive at norma-
tive principles (what Rorty (1990) refers to as a “historico-sociologi-
cal” description of the way we live now) as that people have norma-
tive reasons to accord moral weight to the beliefs of relevant others.
The particularist version is not clearly supported by the influen-
tial theorists, although Rorty, following Rawls (1971), is one of its
most outspoken supporters. Rorty claims that Rawls’s theory of jus-
tice is political and not metaphysical, indicating how liberal demo-
cracy can apparently get along without philosophical presupposi-
tions, requiring only history and sociology (Rorty 1990: 284). Read
closely, however, Rawls calls for serious consideration of certain fun-
damental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a de-
mocratic society, not only because they represent “the way we live
now” but because we have reason to value a society where coercion is
used only in ways that are publicly justifiable to its members. Con-
sequently, the importance of public justifiability leads the political
theorist to see “society’s main institutions and their accepted forms
of interpretation […] as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and prin-
ciples” (Rawls 1993: 13-4). The idea of society as a fair scheme of co-
operation between free and equal citizens is such an idea, articulated
by Rawls in terms of the imaginative construct of the “original posi-
tion”. From that device of representation emerges a substantive theo-
ry of distributive justice (see Rawls 1971).
Seen in a different light, Rawls allocates a constitutive role to the
ideas shared by his fellow citizens for independently justified moral
reasons, not because those shared ideas are all that exist. If it is asked
why it matters that society be publicly justified and hence why poli-
tical philosophy should take shared ideas seriously, the answer lies in
what Rawls calls the “liberal principle of legitimacy”. In Rawls’s
(1993: 137) opinion,
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exer-
cised in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse, in
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common hu-
man reason.
In this view, the political philosopher has a moral reason to care not
only about truth as such, but about truth that can be publicly justified.
74
Acta Academica 2002: 34(1)
75
Visser/Social justice and geography
This argument is by no means uncontested. Fundamental questions
can be asked about any argument that suggests that what is, in terms
of distributive choices, is also what ought to be. The Kantian view, for
one, suggests that this is not possible. Even Marx disagrees to an ex-
tent. Perhaps recourse to communitarian theory is in order. Here it
might be useful to consider the work of Walzer (1983) or MacIntyre
(1998). Yet, even if one assumes that what ought to be is not morally
embedded in a philosophical sense, this does not mean that what ought
to be in its application should not take account of what is and its con-
text. Even Kantians expect the categorical imperative to apply to par-
ticular maxims that arise from particular situations. A thought experi-
ment in role reversal is therefore more than merely an exercise in ab-
stract reason. Insofar as it can address real others, the categorical impe-
rative applies to maxims that are replete with the local, the partial, the
conditional and the contextual. Smith (2000: 211) argues that the view
behind theorists such as Rawls’s veil of ignorance as to people’s status
in society invites a similar interpretation. Okin (1998) too suggests
that Rawls’s theory of justice is most coherently interpreted as a moral
structure founded on people’s equal concern for others as for them-
selves, a theory in which empathy with and care for others, as well as
awareness of their differences, are crucial components.
In sum, in advancing the position that there is a space for parti-
cularist spatio-temporal geographical engagements with empirically
revealed moral choices, criticism cannot be ignored. It is the conten-
tion, though, that the discovery of how things are and how they
might be improved in the eyes of those whom geographers profess to
assist, will encourage greater sensitivity to those differences that real-
ly matter, especially in cases where the interpretation of geographies
is involved. The strategic space for local investigation of geographical
social justice is not that of moral truth per se, but of moral truth that
can be publicly justified, satisfying Rawls’s liberal principle of legi-
timacy. As Smith (2000: 118) notes,
[I]f a geographically sensitive ethics has no more than one major
message, it is the importance of context, of understanding the
particular situation: how things are, here and there. If the human
capacity of putting one’s self in place of others is to be an effective
wellspring of morality, this requires understanding that place, and
its morality.
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2. Spatio-temporally differentiated understandings 
of social justice
Drawing on literature that supports the notion that there is a theore-
tical use for empirical research into how social justice is interpreted by
the general public, this section demonstrates some aspects of the im-
plicit investigation into geographical social justice presented therein.
Consideration is given to studies that aim to provide empirical foun-
dations to test and (re)direct existing social justice theorisation and
possible future theoretical requirements. The study also alludes to a
framework within which a South African geographical engagement
with social justice may be developed. Drawing on these empirical stu-
dies, this section demonstrates that understandings of social justice
are differentiated over space, located in particular histories and geo-
graphies, and contested across class and other social divisions — all
themes that lie at the core of contemporary geographical investigation
but are omitted from current geographical social justice theorisation
(see Visser 2000a for a more in-depth discussion).
In a review of empirical studies, Miller (1992) focused on beliefs
relating to social justice and indicated how these beliefs were nation-
ally differentiated across a number of industrialised capitalist demo-
cracies.1 Although there are as yet no systematic cross-national stu-
dies of beliefs about distributive justice, there are a number of ad hoc
comparative studies at both the macro and the micro levels. Using
the USA as the focus of comparison, Miller (1992) reported that dif-
ferences in understandings of social justice are quite considerable, es-
pecially in the case of societies whose social structure and culture are
radically at variance with that of the USA. In the case of advanced ca-
pitalist democracies, the contrasts are less marked, but there is a ge-
neral tendency for the USA to occupy a different position on matters
such as general attitudes to equality and inequality.
1 I have to point out, as Miller did, that there are grounds for scepticism about
the quality and relevance of the empirical work that has been done in some
cases. The point, however, is not to present a definitive argument but to
illustrate a more general observation that understandings of social justice differ
according to specific spatio-temporal contexts.
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Miller reports that there was substantial variance between coun-
tries such as the United States and a number of European states in re-
lation to income differences. In European countries such as Italy and
West Germany these differences were interpreted as too marked,
while in the USA this view was substantially less pronounced (see for
example Bell & Robinson 1978). Miller (1992: 586) explained the
variance between Britain and the USA in the following terms:
As one might expect (given underlying cultural similarities), the
United Kingdom and the United States are close in their citizens’
general beliefs about justice and somewhat less over the more prac-
tical question of the government’s responsibility to promote social
justice, where the American tradition of anti-governmentalism
makes itself felt, particularly on the issue of welfare provision.
To illuminate this point of “tradition”2, Miller reports that sharp-
er differences emerge from a three-sided comparison between the
USA, Germany and Sweden, using experiments where subjects were
asked to rank contribution, need and equality rules as means of allo-
cating a range of resources (see for example, Tornblom & Foa 1983).
In this study it emerged that whereas American businessmen favour-
ed the contribution rule for most resources and American students fa-
voured it for money and status, Swedish students were egalitarian in
their preference and consistently opposed to the contribution rule.
German students adopted an intermediate position, favouring the
rule for status but not for money. In Miller’s (1992: 547) mind these
differences can be explained as followings:
This pattern of responses corresponds to the differences in political
culture that one would normally attribute to these three societies,
with the United States displaying the highest degree of individua-
lism, Sweden the highest degree of social solidarity and Germany
occupying an intermediate position representing a blend of capita-
list and social democratic ideology.
We need not probe too deeply into either culture or society to re-
cognise that both history and spatial location are key variables in ex-
plaining these differences (see, for example, Hobsbawm 1994; Torn-
blom & Foa 1983). The evidence also presupposes a further point:
2 We might consider Scruton’s (1996: 516) observations concerning the differen-
tiated exposition of the social justice debates in the USA and Europe as expli-
cable by the cultural and historical differences between these societies.
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that while these societies are democratic, industrialised, capitalist
countries there is also differentiation between them.
Very few comparisons have yet been attempted between under-
standings of social justice in developed and developing countries.
Drawing on studies by Murphy-Berman (1984) and Tallman &
Ihinger-Tallman (1979), however, one might suggest that a systema-
tic comparison of societies with well-developed capitalist economies
with those in which market relations have not yet come to occupy
such a central position would find quite significant differences in con-
ceptions of social justice.3 In particular, the pre-eminence of desert
criteria, which was a major theme running through many empirical
studies of Western society, may be radically less marked elsewhere. An
important point made by Miller (1992) is that there might be a very
real difference in the way in which people in the developing world
view the notion of social justice. Not only is there therefore a need for
social justice theories to be sensitive and responsive to differences in
the “North”; it should also be recognised that people in the “South”
may understand social justice in a radically different manner.
Similarly, though, it could be suggested that understandings of
social justice are not stable over time but change, sometimes drama-
tically. Here we may consider the various types of economic policies
implemented by various countries at different times. We may consi-
der, for example, the USA and ask why certain policies were pursued
at certain times. Miller refers to the tradition of anti-governmenta-
lism in the USA. However, one of the sharpest breaks with this
country’s historical trend of individualism and anti-governmentalism
can be found in the introduction of the “New Deal” under Roosevelt
in the 1930s (see for example, Galbraith 1949; Hawley 1969). The
reason for the deviation from normal policy was the societal effects of
3 For example, in Murphy-Berman’s (1984) study, American and Indian respon-
dents were asked to judge how a company should divide a $200 bonus between
two employees in the light of information about each person’s work performance
and domestic needs. The Americans were inclined to favour either equality or
contribution as the basis for distribution; the Indians, on the other hand, over-
whelmingly favoured distribution according to need. In Tallman & Ihinger-
Tallman’s (1979) study in Mexico, need was deemed more just than desert as a
criterium for the distribution of employment opportunities.
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The understanding of social jus-
tice at the time changed: the state had an obligation to redistribute
wealth so as to provide for the poorest. These policies were successful,
but also led to a neo-conservative backlash as a response to the per-
ceived limitations of this system — precursors of “Reaganomics” and
the retreat of the welfare state 40 years later — based on a more tra-
ditional adherence to individual liberty and anti-governmentalist
sentiments (see for example, Galbraith 1983). Likewise, in Britain
the immense destruction of the Second World War led to the notion
that the state had to act as a redistributive agent to guarantee the
betterment of those in the worst positions, leading to the introduc-
tion of the extensive welfare state under Beveridge and Atlee. The
welfare state, however, implied a distribution of society’s benefits and
burdens that was perceived by some members of the electorate to li-
mit the individual’s economic activity and the creation of wealth.
The enormous problems of the welfare state in the late 1970s and the
“undermining” of wealth generation by overly progressive taxation,
for example, arguably led to economic collapse and the Thatcherite
backlash (see for example, Phillips 1993; Simmons 1996).
Interpretations of social justice are, however, not only spatially
differentiated on a national level and changing over time but also so-
cially, geographically and historically differentiated within particular
localities. In this respect we could consider variables such as gender,
class or race categories internal to a particular country or region. In
emulation of the work of Alves & Rossi (1978), Robinson & Bell
(1978) and Beedle & Taylor-Gooby (1983), for example, it is suggest-
ed that beliefs concerning social justice differ between and within va-
rious socio-economic classes. Not only are such beliefs in the USA
different from those held in Britain; within each society they differ
too. Drawing on the work of Hochschild (1981), Kluegel & Smith
(1986), and Lane (1962), as well as McClosky & Zallar (1984), ques-
tions relating to whether the working classes were significantly more
egalitarian in their beliefs about social justice than the middle class
within the same society arrive at some surprising conclusions.
The most interesting example is that working-class subjects (in
America) generally endorsed rather than rejected the dominant belief
in the fairness of income differentials based on skill, effort and achie-
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vement. This was particularly evident in the interview studies of
Lane (1962) and Hochschild (1981). Lane, for example, found that
working-class men rejected the proposition that incomes should be
equal. This, however, did not make class irrelevant to beliefs about
justice and desert. Most studies, in Miller’s (1992: 583) view, find
some correlation between a low rank on one of the class measures and
egalitarianism. The relationships appear easiest to establish when de-
fined in terms of income. In the most general sense there was cross-
class consensus on what constitutes a socially just distribution. How-
ever, where these relationships exist, Miller suggests two broad ave-
nues of inquiry. If one appeals to the idea that beliefs about justice
are a rationalisation of self-interest, people will tend to endorse the
view of justice which, if implemented, would work to their relative
advantage. At the individual level, it has often been observed that
people tend to regard a small percentage increment on their current
income as fair pay for the job they are doing.
Transferring this to the social level, one might expect to find
people at the lower end of the income scale favouring its compression
and those near the top in favour of expanding it, which would give a
familiar and straightforward explanation for the differences in belief
unearthed in empirical studies of social justice. An alternative ap-
proach, potentially very useful to geographers, is to relate differences
of belief to differences in social context. Here it could be argued that
lower-class respondents, for example, tend to have greater exposure
to solidaristic relationships and less exposure to competitive relation-
ships than higher-class respondents. Thus, the linking assumption
would be that one’s immediate social experience colours one’s general
view of society. For example, someone who experiences a high level
of solidarity in his or her everyday relationships will be inclined to
conceive society in solidaristic terms and therefore to use the appro-
priate criteria in making judgements of social justice. In the light of
this, we may finally suggest that understandings of social justice are
differentiated within localities.
These observations enable us to draw a further conclusion, illumi-
nating the differentiated nature of social justice on various scales. Our
discussion of how geography and history shape understandings of so-
cial justice implies that different scales illuminate different understan-
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dings of social justice. We have seen that there are broad differences in
how key characteristics of social justice are differentiated by tradition,
for example, in Scruton’s (1996) observation of “American” and “Euro-
pean” discussions on social justice. We have also observed that social
justice is differentiated in terms of the “developed” or “developing”
nature of a nation’s economy. We have also indicated that differences
exist between countries within Europe, for example, between Sweden
and Germany. So, too, have we seen differences between various strata
within a society, for example, in the USA. Thus social justice is inter-
preted differently by rich people and poor people. The point is that as
we draw different boundaries, different understandings of social justice
emerge. While residents of the USA have a general understanding of
social justice different, for example, from those in Britain, if we delve
deeper, drawing boundaries within Britain or the USA, we find that
understandings of social justice can be expected to vary from one place
to another within each country as well.
These observations, albeit general and somewhat sketchy, point to
a number of concerns central to geographical investigation, some of
the possibilities of which are explored in the concluding section.
3. Towards a framework for South African social 
justice research in geography
The illustrations of differentiated understandings of social justice be-
tween people in different places, at different times and with reference
to differential positioning in the social order, touch upon central
themes in the study of human geography itself — the spatial and
temporal differentiation and organisation of human activity. It is my
contention that these differences hold clear potential for geographical
investigation. By accepting the notion that there is an intellectual
space for investigating empirical understandings of social justice, far
more can potentially be achieved than merely knowing what social
justice is understood to mean to particular theorists and what spatial
implications those theories hold. This suggests at least three new
levels of geographical engagement.
In the first instance — as has been demonstrated in the previous
section — the geographer can aim to uncover what the concept of so-
82
Acta Academica 2002: 34(1)
cial justice represents with reference to multiple variables and insti-
tutions within countless spatio-temporal settings. Such a project mi-
mics aspects of the studies reported above. It would suggest either
direct or indirect observation of how social justice is reflected in
people’s discourse or discernible through their actions. A number of
South African-based questions may be posed, for example:
• To what extent does class frame particular understandings of dis-
tributional issues in South Africa, over time and space? Are
“poor” classes more in favour of egalitarian interpretations of so-
cial justice and are “wealthy” classes in favour of individualistic
liberal views concerning the distribution of material goods? And
spatially, do people living in the townships understand social jus-
tice differently from those in the suburbs. And has this changed
over time?
• Are distributional issues focused on material goods or are they also,
as post-structuralists suggest, framed by non-material interests
such oppression, discrimination, and/or lack of political power?
• By virtue of the historical materiality of apartheid we may also
engage the question of whether the meaning of social justice, as
suggested by communitarians or “the cultural turn” in social
theory, is principally influenced or framed by cultural or ethnic or
religious, or other characteristics?
• Does the spatial proximity of different “others” play a role in the
manner in which social justice is conceptualised? Is the moral
realm affected by the knowledge of poverty in close proximity to
the better-off? And are these views mediated by cultural or social
or political or religious, or other characteristics?
• Which local, regional, national or even international political in-
stitutions should engage with distributional issues? Are there
other types of institutional forces that might oversee or instigate
the distribution of resources, for example, various formations of
civil society such as NGOs or CBOs?
• What methodological techniques are appropriate to these types of
investigations, and why?
The second geographical project is directly related to the first and
would involve a comparison of these empirical descriptions of social
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justice with the various current debates on social justice in the social
sciences. Here geographers would attempt to indicate which theore-
tical understandings of social justice are currently supported in mul-
tiple geographical and historical contexts. As such, these debates
would aim directly at testing the validity of various claims pertain-
ing to social justice and contribute to theoretical debate by identify-
ing those theories that find resonance in empirical reality and those
which may clearly be discarded. This approach could, I believe, pro-
duce fruitful investigations bringing theory and reality closer to-
gether. Here, for example, on might ask:
• Are the theoretical positions supported in geographical research
into social justice relevant to the moral logic illustrated in empi-
rical research? Thus, is there reason to suggest that egalitarian,
structuralist, communitarian or classical liberal interpretations
function as logical wholes in South Africa’s empirical reality?
• Is there empirical substantiation for the rather simplistic view
that a philosophically coherent and “logical” view of distribution-
al desire exists in empirical reality?
The third geographical project would allude to a geographical
theorisation of the concept of social justice, developed with reference
to empirical illustrations of the concept’s meaning in various spatio-
temporal settings. Here geographers would aim to demonstrate that
a deeper spatial structure can be extracted from the empirical under-
standings of social justice at their disposal. Geographers would seek
out similarities in the factors influencing the type of meanings
people ascribe to the concept of social justice. The main task of the
geographer would be to illustrate that its principle explanatory con-
struct, viz space, constitutes one of the core elements which theorists
must consider in the theoretical development of social justice. As a
result, the conclusion which geographers would aim to achieve is
that understandings of social justice are intimately related to space
— that interpretations of space and the histories underlying their de-
velopment directly shape the meaning of social justice and underpin
people’s differentiated and located understandings of this concept.
Thus, the geographical task would not only be to illustrate histori-
cally and spatially differentiated meanings of social justice but also
that space shapes the nature of these ideas, as well as the way in
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which they are negotiated and change over time and with reference
to various spatialities. The questions to be posed may include:
• How does the spatiality of the apartheid city, for example, under-
pin distributional choices in terms of the post-apartheid city?
• Do spatio-historical interpretations of the spatiality of the South
African city underpin divergent interpretations of social justice in
these cities? And should spatiality be involved in shaping moral
beliefs? If so, in which ways may geographers assist in changing
the manner in which space is interpreted in South Africa?
• In what way does the broader moral discourse, both nationally
and internationally, impact upon understandings of social justice
in particular empirical settings? For example, does the manner in
which a particular society or community is described externally
shape the manner in which it understands internal social justice? 
• Can spatial interpretation provide a methodology by which to link
theoretically diverse interpretations of social justice and to theorise
a coherent alternative moral project? For example, in what way can
planning tools, such as Integrated Development Planning, change
the manner in which agents understand their respective right to
resources and responsibility for resource distribution?
These are only suggestive of a broad range of potential questions
South African geographers, and social scientists generally, may pose in
future research. While these suggestions are incomplete, in making
them, this paper aims to stimulate South African geographical reflec-
tion concerning social justice. In presenting an argument that demon-
strates that empirical research focused on contextual conceptualisations
of social justice constitutes a plausible intellectual endeavour, the pos-
sibility of a regionally sensitive engagement with the moral realm
seems possible. Ultimately, there is a post-colonial concern that South
Africans have much to contribute to understanding the different ways
in which social justice is understood. By engaging with what “real
people” actually interpret social justice to be, South African geo-
graphers can make a meaningful contribution, demonstrating how the
interpretation of spatial relations underpin and change the meaning(s)
of distributional issues. Such findings might form the foundation for
moral philosophical reflection, in South Africa and elsewhere.
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